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ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction. 
The City readily concedes in its Respondent's Brief that when Alpine filed its 
development applications Alpine was faced with a non-discretionary, non-variable Ordinance 
that required Alpine to provide community housing units as part of its condominium project. 
The Ordinance (Ordinance No. 819) required developers of residential subdivisions to provide 
"community housing units" equal in number to a specified percentage ofthe total units in the 
subdivision.] These community housing units were required to be deed restricted units available 
for purchase or rent only by income qualified persons.2 
At the core ofthe case before this Court is the issue of whether Alpine's noncompliance 
with I.C. §50-219 deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider the undisputed facts upon which 
Alpine contends that its non-compliance should be excused. Rather than address the merits of 
Alpine's argument as to whether the requirements ofLC. §50-219 are jurisdictional, the City, 
instead, chooses to mischaracterize Alpine's position as being that the notice requirement of the 
statute "is optional". Respondent's Briefat 13. That is of course not Alpine's position, nor has it 
ever been Alpine's position in this litigation. Rather, Alpine argues that neither LC. §50-219, 
nor I.C. §6-908 (which the District Court held is applied to Alpine's claim against the City, 
through I.C. §50-219) contain the clear and unequivocal language which is required to divest this 
1 Alpine Village is considered a "subdivision" under the McCall City Code. 
2 Ordinance 819 was codified as McCall City Code §9.7.1O. R., Ex. II (Ex. 3). It allowed an applicant who was 
subject to the Ordinance to comply in anyone or a combination of the following four ways: (i) to build community 
housing units on the site ofthe development; (ii) to build or provide the community housing units off-site; (iii) to 
provide land for the construction of community housing units; and/or (iv) to pay an "in lieu fee". 
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Court of jurisdiction. As a consequence, this Court is free to consider the unique facts of this 
case as they relate to Alpine's equal protection and estoppel claims. 
The City does not dispute the fact that, after Ordinances 819 and 829 were declared 
unconstitutional, the City invited and paid refund requests from fifty-eight other parties who had 
paid community housing fees pursuant to Ordinance 820. The accrual date for these claims 
would unquestionably have been the date on which the fees were paid. The City accepted and 
paid refund requests which were submitted as long as/orty-three months after the fees had been 
paid. The City did not assert I.C. §50-219 as a bar or defense to any of these refund requests, 
although the City admits that it could have done so. Yet, when Alpine's claim was submitted to 
the City within a lesser time frame than was allowed to the aforesaid refund claimants, the City 
invoked I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim? Rather than offering any explanation or rationale 
whatsoever for this disparate treatment of Alpine, the City simply argues that there was no 
disparate treatment, because Alpine was "made whole" by the City's release of the community 
housing restrictions on the Timbers units more than seventeen months after Alpine's purchase of 
the Timbers complex.4 This position is both factually and legally unsustainable. 
On the issue of whether Alpine's federal claim is "ripe" under "prong I" ofthe U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 0/ 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), the City argues that 
Alpine's federal claim fails because Alpine failed to "probe alternatives" to the acquisition ofthe 
3 The District Court held that Alpine's state constitutional claim accrued not later than December 13,2007. Alpine's 
claim was delivered to the City on November 15, 2010, or approximately thirty-five months after the date of accrual. 
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Timbers units. Respondent's Briefat 32. The City contends that Alpine could have proposed a 
less intrusive manner of compliance with Ordinance 819 which would have eliminated or 
mitigated Alpine's subsequent takings claim. Id p. 30-32. The principal problem with this 
argument is that it ignores the undisputed facts of record. The community housing plan which 
Alpine initially proposed would have used mobile horne spaces already owned by Alpine to 
satisfy the Ordinance's requirements on an interim basis, to be replaced by permanently 
designated off site units in Phase 3 ofthe project. R., Ex. II (Ex. 4). This plan was precisely the 
kind of plan which the City now argues Alpine should have proposed; namely, a plan which 
would not have required Alpine to acquire property prior to the disposition of the Mountain 
Central Board of Realtors litigation. 5 Yet, as the City concedes, this plan was rej ected by the 
City. Respondent's Briefat 9. Thus, despite being faced with the prospect that its Ordinance 
might be invalidated in the pending litigation, the City continued to enforce the Ordinance and 
rejected the very kind of plan which the City now suggests might have avoided this litigation. 
The City offered Alpine two choices: (i) abandon its applications, or (ii) present a plan which 
complied with the Ordinance and which designated the off-site community housing units for the 
entire project. 
The other alternative which the City contends could have been utilized by Alpine in 
satisfaction of its community housing obligations was to pay an "in lieu" fee. Under the 
Ordinance, this fee would have been calculated based on the cost to the City of constructing or 
4 The Timbers was a condominium complex which was purchased by Alpine solely to comply with the community 
housing requirement. 
5 Mountain Central Board a/Realtors, Inc. v. City a/McCall (Valley Case No. CV-2006-490-C) 
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acquiring community housing units. Curiously, the City's position is that, had Alpine done so, 
the City would have refunded the in lieu fee when Ordinance 819 was declared unconstitutional. 
Respondent's Brief at 31. Yet, the City's position in this litigation is that it is under no legal or 
equitable obligation whatsoever to refund to Alpine any of the money which Alpine expended in 
providing the very same units itself. 
II. This Court is not divested of jurisdiction to consider Alpine's claims that it should 
be excused from compliance with I.e. §50-219. 
The District Court found that the provisions ofI.C. §6-908 are applicable to Alpine's 
claim via I.C. §50-219.6 Assuming arguendo that I.e. §6-908 is applicable to Alpine's state 
constitutional takings claim, the issue before this Court is not whether Alpine is entitled to 
disregard I.C. §50-219 or whether compliance with the statute is a "condition precedent" to the 
pursuit of a claim for damages against the City. The narrow issue presented by this case is 
whether this Court is deprived of jurisdiction to consider Alpine's claims that its noncompliance 
with the statute should be excused. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether either I.C. §50-219 or 
I.e. §6-908, on their face, contain sufficiently clear and unequivocal evidence of a legislative 
intent to overcome the presumption of jurisdiction which this Court has held is enjoyed by courts 
of general jurisdiction. 7 
While Alpine recognizes that the Court of Appeals described compliance with the ITCA 
as a jurisdictional requirement in Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 
779 P.2d 433, eCt. App. 1989), Alpine respectively submits that this issue has never been 
6 In its Opening Brief, Alpine has challenged that holding and will not re-visit those arguments in this Reply. 
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squarely addressed by this Court. The simple fact of the matter is that a holding that the statute 
is a "condition precedent" to the pursuit of a claim does not answer the question of whether non-
compliance is jurisdictional. Although the issues of actual or constructive notice arose in two of 
the cases cited by the City, it does not appear that any defense to noncompliance with the statute 
was asserted in any of the cases cited by the City, let alone a defense which was based on the 
conduct of the state or municipality. In such cases, this Court would have had no reason to 
address the issue presented herein. The issue has, however, arisen and been analyzed in a 
significant number of other jurisdictions. It is for this reason that Alpine has presented the 
decisions of those jurisdictions to this Court for consideration. The City has elected to not 
respond to, discuss, or refute any of the reasoning or holdings in the cases cited by Alpine, nor to 
address the underlying and well established principle that courts of general jurisdiction are not to 
be deprived of that jurisdiction casually or impliedly. 
This Court's implicit recognition of this principle and of the legitimate legal distinction 
between a condition precedent which is jurisdictional and one which is procedural is evidenced 
in the language ofLR.C.P. 84(n), which provides: 
(n) Effect of Failure to Comply With Time Limits. The failure to physically file a 
petition for judicial review or cross-petition for judicial review with the district 
cOUli within the time limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be 
jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial 
review upon motion of any party, or upon initiative of the district court. Failure 
of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review shall not 
be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or 
sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of 
the petitionfor review. (emphasis added). 
7 See Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 80, 218 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2009); Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,78, 
205 P.3d, 2019,1214 (2009). 
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Alpine submits that the correct legal holding under the facts of this case would be 
that the requisite legislative intent to elevate the requirements ofI.C. §50-219 or I.C. §6-
908 to jurisdictional requirements is simply lacking. As a result, Alpine's constitutional 
and equitable arguments that the City should not be allowed to assert the statute against 
Alpine as a bar should be considered. Because those arguments are based on 
uncontrovelied facts and were presented below as paIi of the cross motions for summary 
judgment, they are ripe for review and resolution by this Court. 
III. The City should be held to be constitutionally and equitably barred from 
asserting I.e. §50-219 as a defense to Alpine's state takings claim. 
A. Alpine's equal protection claim. 
Alpine recognizes that the rational basis test which is applicable to Alpine's equal 
protection claim affords substantial deference to the City's explanation of the basis for 
distinguishing the treatment which was afforded to Alpine, as opposed to the other fifty-eight 
persons who were adversely impacted by the City's companion Ordinances 819 and 820. 
However, despite repeated invitations in this litigation to do so, the City has offered no basis for 
the disparate treatment. Instead, the City denies that there was any disparate treatment because 
Alpine received "the equivalent of a full refund." Respondent's Brief at 17. This asseliion flies 
in the face of the undisputed facts of record. 
Fifty-eight other persons who were adversely affected by Ordinances 819 and 820 were 
given up to forty-three months to asseli their refund claims. R., Vol. III, p. 402. Although the 
City readily acknowledges that it could have asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to each and everyone 
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of those claims, it declined to do so. Alpine's claim was filed approximately thirty-five months 
after the date on which the District Court held that the claim accrued. For the first time, the City 
asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim. The only difference between the claims regarding 
which the City waived I.C. §50-219 and Alpine's claim is that the other claimants paid their 
money to the City, while Alpine's money was paid to a third party. However, the City does not 
assert this distinction as the basis for the disparate treatment. Instead, the City claims that Alpine 
received the equivalent of a full refund when the City released the community housing 
restrictions on the Timbers units more than seventeen months after Alpine's purchase of the 
Timbers complex. 
This proposition belies the fact that the City temporarily invaded and possessed two of 
Alpine's constitutionally protected property rights; namely, Alpine's money and Alpine's right 
to freely exclude people from and dispose of its property. Having done so, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 
321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389,96 L.Ed. 2d 250 (1987), "[W]here the government's activities have 
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can 
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective." Alpine has not received one dime of compensation from the City for these takings. 
In any event, the City's arguments miss the essence of Alpine's equal protection claim. 
The issue is whether the City has offered any rational basis for waiving I.C. §50-219 as to all of 
the other claimants under the unconstitutional companion Ordinances 819 and 820 and allowing 
those claimants up to fOliy-three months after the accrual of their claims to notify the City, 
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while asseliing that Alpine's claim must have been filed within 180 days after its accrual. The 
answer is that the City has not offered any basis for the disparate treatment, instead continuing 
to deny that it occurred. The issue is not how the City would have responded to Alpine's state 
takings claim, but why Alpine was not afforded the same latitude in asserting it. 
B. Alpine's estoppel claim. 
The City argues that "[E]stoppel cannot operate to grant subject matter jurisdiction, 
which, as we have noted above, is lacking here." Respondent's Briefat 17. The City cites City of 
Eagle v. Idaho Department a/Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011) in support 
ofthis proposition. This is the classically circular argument. The very reason why Alpine's 
estoppel argument can and should be considered is that neither I.C. §50-219 nor I.C. §6-908 are 
jurisdictional. The estoppel argument does not grant subject matter jurisdiction, it prevents the 
City from inequitably asserting a procedural statute as a bar in this case. The City of Eagle case 
is entirely consistent with Alpine's position. Therein, this Court held that the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel could not be applied to extend the 28-day period for appeal of an administrative 
decision, because the 28-day appeal period was a jurisdictional requirement under I.R.C.P. 84(n). 
The critical distinction in City 0/ Eagle is that I.R.C.P. 84(n) provides that: "The failure to 
physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for judicial review with the district 
court within the time limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be jurisdictional and shall 
cause automatic dismissal a/the petitionfor judicial review . ... "(emphasis added). No such 
language exists either in I.C. §50-219 or I.C. §6-906. 
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Once again, the City elects to mischaracterize Alpine's estoppel argument, rather than 
addressing its merits. The City suggests that "Alpine contends that the City changed its position 
by refunding money it collected under Ordinance 820 while declining to further reimburse 
Alpine after releasing it from restrictions imposed under Ordinance 819." Respondent's Briefat 
18. The issue presented by Alpine's estoppel argument is not whether the City's denial of 
Alpine's claim constituted an impermissible change of position, but, rather, whether the City 
should be estopped from changing its position as to whether it would assert I.C. §50-219 as a bar 
to claims resulting from the City's imposition of the community housing ordinances. 
Next, the City invites this Court to adopt the proposition that it is Alpine who changed its 
position, arguing that: "As shown in an e-mail from counsel for Alpine to the City on April 26, 
2008 (two days after the City repealed Ordinance 819), Alpine sought nothing more than a 
release of the housing restrictions on the Timbers ... " (emphasis added). Respondent's Briefat 
18. The e-mail in question states in pertinent paIi as follows: 
Lindley, 
I am assuming that, given the Mountain Central Board of Realtors Decision and 
the subsequent repeal of Ordinance No. 819, the City is prepared to release Alpine 
Village from its community housing plan. Toward that end, I have attached a 
"First Amendment to Development Agreement" which does so. 
R., Vol. III, p. 422. 
Alpine was obviously obliged to seek a release of the community housing restrictions on 
the Timbers units, as part of Alpine's duty to mitigate its damages. There is nothing in the 
subject e-mail which justifies the City'S suggestion that the release made Alpine whole, or that 
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the release is all that Alpine was seeking, or that Alpine stated any position in the e-mail which 
has changed. 
Lastly, the City argues that Alpine has not shown that it relied to its detriment on the 
City's waiver ofI.C. §50-219 in the fifty-eight other claims made after the community housing 
ordinances were declared unconstitutional and invalid on their face. The City does not cite any 
authority for the proposition that reliance is an element of a claim of quasi estoppel. That is 
because it is not. 8 
The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Alpine did no more than comply in 
good faith with the non-discretionary city ordinances which applied to its applications. Alpine 
proposed a less intrusive community housing plan which would not have required it to acquire or 
build any community housing units prior to the outcome ofthe Mountain Central Board of 
Realtors litigation. That plan was rejected by the City. The City had control of this process at 
every turn and called the shots. Alpine had no way of knowing whether that litigation would last 
months or years, what the decision of the District Court would be, or that the City would elect 
not to appeal the adverse District Court decision. After the Ordinances were invalidated, the 
community housing restrictions were released and Alpine had the opportunity to evaluate the 
mess with which it was left, it filed a claim with the City that was every bit as timely as the other 
claims which were filed with and paid by the City. The only reason that the City then, for the 
first time, asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim is that the City fears the claim will be 
substantially larger than the other claims which the City has accepted and paid. To allow the 
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City to isolate Alpine's claim under these facts would be unconscionable; and, the City has not 
offered this Court any legitimate basis to hold otherwise. 
IV. Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation claim was timely filed under 
I.e. §5-224. 
The City, for the first time in this litigation, asserts that LC. §6-911 might be the 
governing statute of limitations in this case. Respondent's Brief at 19. This is in direct conflict 
not only with the precedent established by this Court but with the positions taken by the City 
throughout this litigation. In the City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed in 
the United States District Court after the City removed the case to federal court, the City asserted 
that "Alpine's state takings claim is subject to Idaho's residual four-year statute of limitations, 
Idaho Code §5-224." R., Ex. II (Ex. 24, p.7). This position was repeated by the City after the 
case was remanded, in the City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R., 
Vol. II, p. 317) and in City's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Response Brief in Opposition to Alpine's Alotion for Summary Judgment (R., Vol. III, p. 440). 
The City was correct in these assertions. The Statute of Limitations which applies to Alpine's 
state constitutional claim is LC. §5-224.9 
The City contends that Alpine's state cause of action accrued on the day that Alpine filed 
its Applications. Contrary to the City's statement that this position is supported by a "mountain 
of appellate precedent" (Respondent's Briefat 20), just the opposite is true. As Alpine discussed 
in its Opening Brief, this Court has stated in numerous decisions that a takings/inverse 
8 See Willigv. State Dept. o/Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). 
9 McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213,217,912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996). 
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condemnation cause of action accrues "after the full extent of the impailment of the plaintiffs' 
use and enjoyment of [ the property] becomes apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 
667,671,603 P.2d 1001,1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798,802,160 
Ct.Cl. 295 (1963)). It is important to recognize that in Tibbs, this Court was also deciding when 
damages in an inverse condemnation case accrued, "both the extent and the measure of damages, 
are inextricably fixed by a finding of the time of taking." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670,603 P.2d at 
1004. The Tibbs Court concluded that the time of the taking, the accrual ofthe taking claim, and 
the time from which to measure a plaintiffs damages, although not readily susceptible to exact 
detelmination, must all be fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree 
and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became 
apparent. The City's entire argument on this issue extracts the word "apparent" but attaches it to 
a completely different concept, arguing that, when Alpine filed its application, it was "apparent" 
that it might somehow be impacted by Ordinance 819. That is simply not the standard in Idaho 
for determining the accrual date of a takings claim such as the claim being asserted by Alpine. 
The undisputed facts of this case support the District Comi's holding that Alpine's state 
takings/inverse condemnation claim accrued on December 13,2007, when the Development 
Agreement for Alpine Village was signed, dedicating all seventeen of the Timbers units as 
community housing units for Alpine Village. R., Vol. III, p. 528. When Alpine filed its 
Applications, it simply could have had no idea of how Ordinance 819 would be applied to its 
project. The Ordinance had only been recently enacted and had no history of application to 
development applications. The impact on Alpine of its initially proposed Community Housing 
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Plan bears no resemblance to the impairment of Alpine's property interests which resulted from 
the Plan which Alpine was required to propose, after its initial Plan was rejected. Under 
Ordinance 819, only the City Council had authority to review and approve a Community 
Housing Plan. Alpine's applications did not even reach the City Council until December 13, 
2006, when the City Council conducted its first public hearing on the project; and, even then, the 
Council deferred consideration of the Plan until Alpine's Final Plat was submitted. R., Ex. II (Ex. 
9, p.3, Finding No. 18 and p. 6, Conclusion No. 2.12). The Final Plat and the revised 
Community Housing Plan for the project were not reviewed and approved by the Council until 
August 23,2007. R., Ex. II, (Ex. 15). Throughout this period oftime, the Council was 
determining how it would proceed in light of the Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation, 
whether it would continue to process Alpine's Applications and whether it would continue to 
impose the Ordinance on Alpine. The unusual factual record in this case belies any credible 
argument that, when Alpine filed its Applications, it could have had any clear understanding of 
how its property interests would ultimately be affected by the application of the Ordinance. 
The City has cited McCuskey for the proposition that Alpine's claim accrued on the date 
on which Alpine first filed its applications with the City, because Ordinance 819 was then in 
effect. However, McCuskey simply does not support this argument. A review of the facts of 
McCuskey helps explain why. McCuskey acquired the subject property in 1978. A year later, 
Canyon County adopted an ordinance which had the effect of "down zoning" McCuskey's 
property. Seven years later, in 1986, McCuskey obtained a building permit for a use which does 
not appear to have been allowed by the County's zoning ordinance. The County promptly issued 
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a stop work order. McCuskey sued (but did not allege a taking or inverse condemnation), and in 
1993 the Supreme Court held that the subj ect zoning ordinance was void (the McCuskey I 
decision). Then, in 1994, McCuskey filed an inverse condemnation action against the County. 
The Supreme Court held that the inverse condemnation action accrued not when the "down 
zone" ordinance was adopted (in 1979) and not when McCuskey I was decided (in 1993), but, 
rather, when the stop work order was issued, reasoning that: 
[T]his Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation should be 
assessed at the time the taking occurs. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 
670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) (citation omitted). The time of taking occurs, 
and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the 
plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the propeliy becomes apparent. 
Intermountain West, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769 (citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 
671,603 P.2d at 1005). 
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 217,912 P.2d at 104. 
If Alpine was arguing that its inverse condemnation action did not accrue until the 
Mountain Central Board of Realtors decision was issued, the City's citation of McCuskey would 
be appropriate. However, that is not Alpine's position. Consistent with McCuskey, Alpine is 
arguing that its inverse condemnation action accrued not on the date that Ordinance 819 was 
adopted and not on the date on which the Mountain Central Board of Realtors decision was 
issued, but, rather, when the full extent of Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment of its 
constitutionally protected property rights became apparent. As the District Court held, this 
occurred on December 13,2007, when Alpine executed the Development Agreement for Alpine 
Village, committing to dedicate the Timbers units as community housing units. Under the 
undisputed facts of record, the earliest that this could be said to have occurred was on March 22, 
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2007 when,for the first time, Alpine's proposed acquisition and dedication ofthe Timbers units 
as community housing units for Alpine Village was approved by the City Council. In either 
case, Alpine's filing of its Complaint on December 10,2010 was well within the allowable four-
year statute of limitations. 
V. The City's contentions that Alpine failed to properly exhaust its administrative 
remedies and that Alpine's actions were "voluntary" are without merit. 
A. The voluntariness claim. 
Citing KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), the City argues 
that Alpine's expenditure of in excess oftwo million dollars to acquire the Timbers complex and 
acceptance of severe restrictions on its ownership rights were "voluntary", thereby relieving the 
City of any liability. At the outset, it is noteworthy that, when advancing its statute of limitations 
arguments, the City repeatedly characterizes Ordinance 819 as imposing mandatory and non-
discretionary community housing requirements on Alpine. The City then reverses its position 
and argues that Alpine somehow could have refused to comply with this mandatory and non-
discretionary ordinance and that Alpine's failure to do so results in its compliance with the 
Ordinance having been "voluntary". In any event, the facts of KMSTbear no resemblance to the 
facts of this case. 
In KMST, the Court found that the Ada County Highway District Staff had no authority to 
impose upon KMST the condition that a new road be constructed as part of the proposed 
development. KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. In other words, the Court found that there 
was no ordinance or statutory requirement that KMST dedicate or construct the road in question. 
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Instead, the Court cited the District Court finding that "representatives included the construction 
and dedication of Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that failing to do so 
would delay closing on the property and development of the propeliy." Id 
In contrast to KMST, it is indisputable that Alpine's development applications were 
subject to Ordinance 819 and that, as the City readily concedes elsewhere in its Brief, Alpine's 
compliance with Ordinance 819 was mandatory. The Ordinance was in place when Alpine filed 
its Applications. By its terms, the Ordinance was not discretionary and Alpine Village clearly 
fell within its purview because the project consisted predominantly of "residential units". Both 
the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission and the McCall City Council found that the 
Applications were subject to the requirements of the Ordinance. The City Council required, as a 
condition of approval, that Alpine present a final Community Housing Plan with its Final Plat 
and that the Plan be incorporated into a recorded Development Agreement. When the Mountain 
Central Board of Realtors lawsuit was filed, the City elected to continue to apply the Ordinance 
to the Alpine Village Applications rather than to suspend it. The City rejected Alpine's initial 
plan to utilize propeliy which it already owned to satisfy the off-site community housing 
component and required Alpine to identify its' off-site community housing units. The City was 
specifically aware that Alpine was acquiring the Timbers units solely to comply with the 
requirements of the Ordinance. The City's assertion that Alpine's compliance with Ordinance 
819 was "voluntary" is completely unsupported by the undisputed facts of record. 
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B. The exhaustion argument. 
The City also contends that Alpine failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by failing 
to inform the City that Ordinance 819 was unlawful or seek an amendment to the Development 
Plan as provided in the McCall City Code §3.1O.12. Both arguments should be rejected. As to 
Alpine's supposed obligation to inform the City that the Community Housing Ordinance was 
unlawful, the City conveniently neglects to point out that, prior to the City Council's very first 
review and consideration of Alpine's Applications, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors had 
initiated its litigation against the City, challenging the very authority ofthe City to impose the 
Community Housing requirements. The City Council was, thus, fully on notice that its 
Ordinances might be unlawful before it began its review of the Applications. Citing the 
Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation, the City declared a moratorium on all new land 
use applications and building permits pending the outcome ofthe litigation. In further 
recognition of the Alountain Central Board of Realtors litigation, the City required a limited 
release of claims to be included in Alpine's Development Agreement with City. However, the 
City did not take any of the steps that could have prevented this litigation, such as accepting 
Alpine's initially proposed and less intrusive Community Housing Plan or suspending the 
application of the Ordinance to Alpine's Applications. On the other side ofthe table, Alpine had 
invested significant time and financial resources in the Applications. It had attempted without 
success to gain approval of a much less intrusive Community Housing Plan, which would have 
deferred any property acquisitions until well after the conclusion ofthe Mountain Central Board 
of Realtors litigation. It had absolutely no way of knowing how long that litigation would drag 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 17 
on. Alpine was offered only two choices by the City: abandon its Applications, or comply with 
the Ordinance by putting forth a plan which designated all of the required community housing 
units for all phases ofthe Alpine Village Project. Given these facts, it is disingenuous ofthe City 
to suggest that Alpine was legally obligated to "proceed under protest". Simply put, the City was 
well aware of the risk it was taking. 
The City also argues that Alpine failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by not 
seeking an amendment under the McCall City Code §3.1 0.12. 10 This Code section allows a party 
to seek an amendment to a "Final Development Plan" after the Plan has received final approval. 
The Final Development Plan is part of the Planned Unit Development approval process under 
Title 3 ofthe McCall City Code. As such, it is distinct and separate from the Subdivision 
approval process, which is provided for in Title 9 of the Code, in which the Community Housing 
Ordinances were contained. The City is apparently confusing the PUD Final Development Plan 
with the Alpine Village Development Agreement. The Community Housing requirements which 
are at the heart of this action were triggered by Alpine's subdivision applications (i.e. 
preliminary and final plat) and were memorialized in the Development Agreement between the 
City and Alpine. The Development Agreement was required by McCall City Code §9.6.06 1l . In 
sum, McCall City Code §3.1 0.12 has nothing to do with the community housing requirements of 
the McCall City Code or the Development Agreement in which Alpine's Community Housing 
Plan was memorialized. As such, no amount of amendments to the PUD Final Development 
Plan could have relieved Alpine from the mandatory Community Housing requirements. 
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In its Appellant's Brief, Alpine asselis that, in any event, Alpine was exempt from any 
exhaustion requirements because the City clearly acted outside its authority in requiring 
compliance with the requirements of the Community Housing Ordinances. The City 
acknowledges that there is an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement 
when an agency has acted outside its authority. Respondent's Briefat 25. However, the City 
then argues that, "A review of this Court's decisions strongly suggest that this exception applies 
only to facial challenges." Id. That broad assertion is not well taken. 12 Moreover, it is important 
to recognize the one significant fact which distinguishes this case from those cited by the City on 
this issue; namely, that the law of this case is that the City clearly acted outside of its authority 
and arbitrarily and capriciously in imposing the Community Housing Ordinances on Alpine. In 
the Mountain Central Board of Realtors final decision, the District Court found that the 
Community Housing Ordinances attempted to regulate a landowner's ownership rather than use 
of property, that the City lacked authority to impose the Ordinances, and that the Ordinances 
were an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the City's police powers. The City concedes that 
when an agency strays outside of its authority, the action may be challenged without 
exhaustion.13 This issue has been fully and finally resolved against the City and is the law of this 
10 Section 3.1 0.12 of the McCall City Code is attached hereto as Addendum l. 
11 Section 9.6.06 is part of Title 9 "Subdivisions" and is attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
IZ See, for example, Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2008). Locsha Falls brought 
constitutional challenges to certain IDT regulations, which the District Court dismissed for the failure of Losch a 
Falls to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Comi considered Lochsa Fall's "outside agency 
authority" exemption to the exhaustion requirement, even though the court characterized the constitutional taking 
challenges as "as applied" challenges. 
13 Respondent's Brie/at 26. 
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case. This fact alone distinguishes this case and suggests that the "outside agency authority" 
exemption would apply to Alpine's claims. 
VI. Alpine was not required to seek judicial review of the City's approval of its 
applications under the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
I.e. §67-6521(2)(b) states as follows: 
(b) An affected person claiming "just compensation" for a perceived "taking," the 
basis of the claim being that a final action restricting private propeliy 
development is actually a regulatory action by local government deemed 
"necessary to complete the development of the material resources ofthe state," or 
necessary for other public uses, may seek a judicial determination of whether the 
claim comes within defined provisions of section 14, miicle I, of the constitution 
of the state of Idaho relating to eminent domain. Under these circumstances, the 
affected person is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and 
may seek judicial review through an inverse condemnation action specifying 
neglect by local government to provide "just compensation" under the provisions 
of Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and Chapter 7, 
Title 7, Idaho Code. 
The City argues that I.C. § 67-6521(2)(b) does not exempt Alpine from the obligation to 
seek judicial review under I.C. §67-6521(1). In support ofthis position, the City relies upon the 
holding in KMST, LLC v. County of Ada. Such reliance is misplaced. In KMST, the District 
court addressed KMST's claim that the developer's dedication of a street and the later imposition 
by the Ada County Highway District of impact fees constituted a taking. The District Court 
accepted KMST's argument that I.C. §67-6521 (2) (b) exempted KMST from exhausting its 
administrative remedies before judicially challenging the Highway District's calculation ofthe 
fees. This Court disagreed, holding: 
By its terms, that statute [§ 67-6521(2)(b)] has no application to the impact fees 
imposed in this case. It only applies if the basis of the inverse condemnation 
claim is "that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting private 
property development is actually a regulatory action by local government deemed 
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'necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state,' or 
necessary for other public uses." (emphasis added). 
KMST 138 Idaho at 584, 67 P.3d at 63. 
As this Court clearly stated in the KMST decision, the Highway District had no authority 
to approve or reject the developer's application or to impose any conditions of approval on the 
application. The proposed street dedication was found to be a completely voluntary action by the 
developer. Moreover, the Highway District's Ordinance which authorized the imposition of 
impact fees provided an administrative procedure for challenging those fees. In this case, the 
City clearly had final authority over Alpine's Applications and its imposition of the Community 
Housing Ordinance on Alpine as a mandatory and non-discretionary condition was clearly part 
of its regulatory process. Additionally, under the Local Land Use Planning Act, only cities and 
counties are "local governrnents.,,14 Thus, this Court's holding in KMSTthat the judicial review 
exemption ofI.C. §67-6521(2)(b) was not applicable to the ordinances of a highway district is 
not surprising on this basis alone. In any event, the plain language ofI.C. §67-6521 (2)(b) does 
make the exemption applicable to the regulatory actions of the City of McCall in this case; and, 
the KMST decision is in accord with that conclusion. 
The City fmiher argues that I.C. §67-6521(2)(b) is aimed at facilitating only taking 
challenges that are based on the allegation that the taking was not for a legitimate public use, 
which, by inference, would not include Alpine's takings claim. Respondents Brie/at 12, fn. 8. In 
support of this interpretation of the statute, the City claims that the statutory language ofI.C. 
14 I.e. §67-6503. Every city and county shall exercise the powers conferred by this chapter. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 21 
§67 -6521 (2)(b) is "obtuse" and that this Court should therefore resOli to the Statute's legislative 
history for clarification. To the contrary, the language ofI.C. §67-6521 (2)(b) is clear and 
unambiguous and as such, resort to legislative history is neither required nor appropriate. 
It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative 
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of 
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. (citing Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'l Afed Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011). 
Peck v. State, Dept. ojTransp., 278 P.3d 439, 448 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012). 
Nothing in the language of I.C. §67 -6521 (2)(b) remotely suggests that the judicial review 
exemption of the Statute is limited to taking claims alleging the taking is not for a legitimate 
public use. The Statute's language clearly exempts those claims for compensation for a taking 
based upon a regulatory action by a local government deemed necessary for a public use. It is 
undisputed that the Community Housing Ordinance was a regulatory action deemed necessary by 
the City for a public use. It is further undisputed that the second Amended Complaint of Alpine 
Village alleges a cause of action against the City claiming compensation for a taking under the 
provisions of Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. As such, I.C. §67-
6521(2)(b) exempts Alpine from the requirements of judicial review required by I.C. §67-
6521(1) and pelTI1its Alpine's judicial review through a direct action for inverse condemnation. 
VII. Alpine's takings claims under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution satisfy 
the ripeness requirements of Williamson COllnty Reg 'I Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. IS 
The City correctly argues that the ripeness tests which were articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the Williamson County decision are applicable exclusively to Alpine's federal 
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takings claims. Williamson County established a two pronged ripeness test. The first prong 
requires that the decision of the governing body being challenged be a "final decision". The 
second prong requires that Alpine have sought and been denied compensation under a state 
constitutional inverse condemnation claim. Alpine's federal claim meets both ripeness tests. 
A. The "final decision" requirement. 
The City's argument regarding the "final decision" ripeness requirement appears to be 
that, first, Alpine's acquisition of the Timbers complex and compliance with Ordinance 819 was 
"voluntary" and, second, that Alpine failed to "probe alternatives to proceeding with the 
Timbers ... " Respondent's Briefat 30-32. The fundamental factual and legal flaws in the City's 
continued and inconsistent assertion that Alpine's compliance with the Ordinance was 
"voluntary" have been discussed above and will not be repeated here. 16 The assertion that 
Alpine failed to probe alternatives to the acquisition of the Timbers is unequivocally false. 
Alpine initially submitted a Community Housing Plan which proposed to construct some 
units on-site and to convert mobile horne rental spaces already owned by Alpine to rent restricted 
spaces on an "interim" basis. The Plan proposed to replace those mobile horne spaces with 
permanent off-site units within three years after Phase 3 ofthe Alpine Village project was final 
platted. R, Ex. II (Ex. 4). Under this Plan, none of the on-site units would have been constructed 
and no permanent off-site units would have been acquired or constructed until after the 
conclusion ofthe Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation. As the City acknowledges in 
its Respondent's Brief, that Plan was rejected by the City. Respondent's Briefat 9. Alpine was 
15 473 U.S. 172,105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985) 
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directed to present a new Plan which designated the permanent off-site units. It is difficult to 
reconcile the City's argument that Alpine failed to probe alternatives to the acquisition of the 
Timbers with these uncontroverted facts. To the extent that the "final decision" prong of 
Williamson County did, in fact, require Alpine to probe alternative and less intrusive means of 
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, which is far from clear, Alpine 
unquestionably did so. When its attempts were rebuffed by the City, it proposed a Plan which fell 
squarely within the express parameters of Ordinance 819.17 
B. Alpine has properly sought compensation under the Article 14, Section 1 of 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho, in satisfaction of the second 
Williamson ripeness test. 
The City argues that Alpine has failed to meet the second prong of Williamson County 
because Alpine failed to seek judicial review under the Local Land Use Planning Act within 28 
days after the project received final approval from the City and because Alpine's state takings 
16 See discussion above at Section V. 
17 The City appears to acknowledge that a variance fi-om the requirements of Ordinance 819 was not available to 
Alpine. Instead, the City's argument is that the "failure to probe alternatives" is analogous to the failure to seek a 
variance which was the case in Williamson. Tn any event, Alpine concurs that neither the McCall City Code, nor the 
Local Land Use Planning Act would have allowed a variance fi'om the requirements of Ordinance 819 to be granted. 
The tenn "variance" as utilized in a land uselzoning context is limited in scope and would not be a proceeding 
available to Alpine to seek relief from the Community Housing requirements mandated by City. Under the Local 
Land Use Planning Act, a variance is limited to matters relating to the size and setbacks oflots, heights of buildings 
or provisions affecting the size, shape or placement of structures on a lot. I.C. §67-6516. " ... A variance is a 
modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front 
yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance provision affecting the 
size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size of lots." Likewise, the McCall City 
Code defines variance as "The relaxation of an otherwise applicable dimensional requirement." McCall City Code 
§3.3.02. The McCall City Code also restricts the types of variances authorized. McCall City Code §3.13.012 "(C) 
Modification Of Requirements: A variance may be granted modifYing the requirements of this title respecting: lot 
width; lot depth; front, side, and rear yard setbacks; lot coverage; parking space; height of buildings; or other 
ordinance provisions affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size 
or shape oflots. A variance may not be used to authorize a land use not otherwise allowed in the applicable zone or 
to increase the density of development beyond that which is authorized in the comprehensive plan." 
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claim was not timely filed. Both of these arguments have been addressed in Alpine's Appellant's 
Briefand above in this Appellant's Reply Brief 18 Alpine has, in fact, proceeded in strict 
compliance with the U.S. Supreme COlili's decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County 
a/San Francisco, et al., 545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005). Alpine has 
joined its state inverse condemnation/takings claim with its federal takings claims. In the event 
that compensation is denied to Alpine under the state claim, the federal claims will become ripe. 
VIII. Alpine's federal takings claims are timely under I.e. §5-219(4). 
The City's strained and tortuous argument that Alpine's federal claims are untimely turns 
on the assertion that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 Fold 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993) and Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan 
Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003) apply only to causes of action filed in federal court. According to the 
City, this is the "precise holding of San Remo." Respondent's Brief at 40. To the contrary, there 
is no suppOli in the San Remo decision for this proposition. This was recognized by the District 
Court when it rejected this very argument. This was also recognized by the Honorable B. Lynn 
Winmill, Chief United States District Judge, who in his Decision remanding this case reasoned 
that: 
The accrual of a federal takings claims turns on the exhaustion of state remedies: 
"[T]he date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is denied in state courts, 
or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to state courts is futile." Hacienda 
Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003), (citing Levald, 
Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 Fold 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993)). There is no 
contention that the exhaustion requirement is futile here. Therefore, Alpine 
18 See Appellant's Brief at 16-29; See discussion at Sections IV and VI above. 
APPELLANT'S REPL Y BRIEF - PAGE 25 
Village's federal claim does not accrue until compensation is denied in state 
court, and it appears that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run. 
R., Ex. II (Ex. 29, at p. 6). 
In an accompanying footnote, Judge Winmill specifically rejected the argument being 
made by the City in this appeal: 
The City argues that Hacienda Valley jWabile Estates and Levald apply only 
"with respect to a federal claim brought first in federal court." (cite omitted). But 
the Ninth Circuit's rationale is at least as strong in the context of a state case 
removed to federal court. Id at fn. 2. 
The precise argument being made by the City herein was also rejected by the United 
States District COUli for the Western District of Washington in the post-San Rema decision, 
Olhausen v. City afSammamish, 2011 Westlaw 683902. Therein, the propeliy owner spent three 
years litigating its state takings claim. After ultimately been denied compensation under the state 
claim, the property owner then initiated a federal takings claim in federal comi. The District 
Court rejected the City's argument that the claim accrued when the property owner's subdivision 
application was denied and that, therefore, the applicable three year statute of limitations on the 
federal takings claim had run. Citing Levald, the District Court held that the federal claim did 
not accrue until compensation was denied in the state court proceedings. 
After removing this case to federal court and in its briefing in opposition to Alpine's 
motion to remand the case, one of the arguments offered by the City against remand was that 
remand to state court "would risk misapplication of controlling federal law." R., Ex. II (Ex. 27, at 
pp. 1,5). In its arguments regarding the application ofI.C. §5-219(4) to Alpine's federal takings 
claims, it would appear that this is precisely what the City is inviting this Comi to do. 
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IX. The City's actions effectuated a temporary taking for which Alpine is entitled to 
receive compensation. 
The City acknowledges in its Respondent's Brief that temporary takings claims are 
recognized by the Idaho COUlis19 and the United States Supreme Court?O However, citing 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002) and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004), the City 
argues that temporary takings are limited only to situations in which there is a "total deprivation" 
of all use of the property.21 Although this limitation may apply to certain types of takings 
claims, it is inapplicable to Alpine's claim. 
Tahoe-Sierra presented the question of whether a moratorium on development imposed 
during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan for Lake Tahoe constituted a per 
se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The court was, thus, presented with a Lucas regulatory taking case regarding 
which the COUli held, "[t]he categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is 
required when a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of his land. 
Id., at 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886". Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 
19 McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d 100 (1996). McCuskey claim for temporary 
taking arose between the time a stop work order requiring McCuskey to cease construction of a convenience store 
was issued and the time the Court declared invalid, the county ordinance that the stoop work order was based upon. 
20 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 
L.Ed. 2d 250 (1987) "If a regulation of private property that amount to a taking is later invalidated, this action 
converts the taking to a "temporary" one for which the government must pay the landowner forth value of the use of 
the land during that period" 
21 See Respondent's Brie/at 45 citing as authority Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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535 U.S. 302, 330, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1483, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002.) 22 In Moon, this Court was 
also presented with a Lucas regulatory taking. 
The taking asserted then, is in the nature of a regulatory taking, but the plaintiffs 
have not claimed a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of 
their land. As such, under the Idaho Constitution, which does not allow less than 
a total deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 
S. Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, there is no taking in violation of the state or the 
federal constitution. See also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, et at., 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 
(2002). 
Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,542,96 P.3d 637,643 (2004). 
While these decisions may, indeed, be relevant to Lucas takings claims, what the City 
fails to recognize is that Alpine has not asserted a Lucas takings claim. Rather, Alpine has 
suffered a Loretto, per se physical taking.23 This is a very impOliant distinction, the significance 
of which was acknowledged in both the Tahoe-Sierra and Moon decisions. 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the court recognized that per se Loretto taking claims require an entirely 
different analysis from those raised under Lucas: 
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for 
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, 
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 
(1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel 
or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is 
taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, even 
though that use is temporary. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 
U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946). Similarly, when the government 
22 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Lucas 
was a regulatory action deemed to be a per se taking where regulations completely deprive an owner of all 
economically beneficial use of property, 
23 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,440, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3178, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 
(1982). Loretto holds that a regulation that authorizes a physical occupation of property by third parties is a taking. 
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appropriates part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment 
tenants, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 
3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); or when its planes use private airspace to approach 
a government airport, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 
L.Ed. 1206 (1946), it is required to pay for that share no matter how small. ... 
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on 
the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it 
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents 
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice 
versa. For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appropriation 
advances a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the owner of all 
economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical 
takings context to regulatory takings claims. 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322. 
Likewise in Moon, the alleged taking was a regulatory, Lucas type taking. In Moon, this 
Court expressly noted that a temporary physical, Loretto type taking is compensable whether or 
not it pelmanently deprives the property owner of all economically beneficial uses of the 
property.24 Thus, the holdings in Tahoe-Sierra and Moon are not inconsistent with Alpine's 
position in this case. 
The City next argues that no temporary taking occurred in this case because, "After all, 
Alpine still owns the Timbers, and the City acted promptly and without prodding to release 
Alpine from any requirements imposed in the development Agreements." Respondent's Brie/at 
44. This is the same argument which was rejected by the Supreme Court in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church a/Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321, 107 
S. Ct. 2378, 2389, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987), in which the Court held that, once a taking is 
24 See Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541-42, 96 P.3d 637, 642-43 (2004). 
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established, "no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." 
The City does not dispute that under Loretto, where government requires an owner to 
suffer a permanent physical invasion of its property, a per se taking will be deem to have 
occurred. Rather, the City simply argues that Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, 25 which were cited by 
Alpine, bear no resemblance to the taking which resulted from the application of Ordinance 819 
to Alpine's project. Respondent's Brief at 46, and tn 36. 
In Loretto, the United States Supreme Court held that a New York statute which provided 
that a landlord must permit a cable TV provider to install its cable TV facilities on the landlord's 
property and further provided that the landlord could not demand payment from the cable TV 
provider in excess of an amount deemed by a state commission to be reasonable, constituted a 
taking. The Loretto court recognized the historical and traditional view that a government 
regulation which authorized the occupation of propeliy by a third party constituted a taking. The 
physical occupation condemned in Loretto as a per se taking consisted of the use of a small 
portion of a rooftop for the installation of cable TV facilities. By way of contrast, the protected 
property interests which were taken from Alpine consisted of Alpine's money, Alpine's right to 
dispose of its property, Alpine's right to freely exclude others from the property and to determine 
who will occupy the property. 
25 Kaiser Aetna v. U. S., 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383,62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979) 
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Likewise in Kaiser Aetna, the court found a taking where the government imposed a 
navigational servitude upon Kaiser Aetna's private waterway, thus creating an easement the 
public could enjoy. The court held, 
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a 
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests 
that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in 
which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will 
cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the 
imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual 
physical invasion of the privately owned marina. 
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179. 
In both Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, the takings resulted from a regulation that subjected a 
property owner to a physical invasion by third parties of a fundamental property right. 
Conversely, regulations which merely regulate the use of property may not constitute a taking. 
Our holding today is very nan-ow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent 
physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner 
entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of 
the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of 
property regulation. We do not, however, question the equally substantial 
authority upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon 
an owner's use of his propeliy. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter A1anhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3179, 73 
L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982). 
Despite the City'S invitation to do so, it is not necessary or appropriate in this case to 
debate the issue of whether Ordinance 819 merely regulated Alpine's use of its property. That 
issue was resolved in the District Court's decision in Mountain Central Board of Realtors at 
pages 29 to 30: 
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However, the City of McCall's requirement that twenty percent of new 
subdivisions be deed-restricted community housing regulates much more than a 
landowner's "use" of his or her property. The restrictions for community housing 
dictate the price for which the property may be sold and to whom the property 
may be sold ... These restrictions go much further than merely regulating the use 
of property; instead they essentially regulate ownership of the property by 
dictating to whom a unit may be sold or rented. 
Thus, as established by the decision in jl;[ountain Central Board of Realtors the taking 
which occurred in this case falls squarely within the Loretto per se category of takings. In such 
case, the taking is compensable despite being only "temporary". 26 
x. Alpine did not release or waive its takings claims. 
The City argues that Alpine has waived and released the City from the takings claims 
which are at issue in this case by means of the language in the Alpine Village Development 
Agreement. Respondent's Brief at 28. However, the language of the Development Agreement is 
clear and unambiguous. The City required Alpine to release only those claims "as to the 
Commlmity Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this Plan prior to the final disposition of 
such litigation." R, Ex. II (Ex. 16, Section VII) (i.e. the Mountain Central Board of Realtors 
litigation). No units were sold prior to the final disposition of the litigation. This limited release 
is what was bargained for by the parties, with input and review by the City attorney. Having 
rejected Alpine's less intrusive Community Housing Plan and elected to continue to impose 
26 The City's reliance on Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992) is also misplaced. The 
critical factual predicate of the Court's decision in Yee was that the property owners were not required to subject 
themselves to the Ordinance, in that the property owners were not required to rent to mobile home owners. Alpine, 
in contrast, had no such choice. The City controlled and dictated to whom Alpine could rent or sell the Timbers 
units and at what price. 
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Ordinance 819 on Alpine despite the Mountain Central challenge, the City was well aware of the 
risk which it was taking. 
The City invites this Court to read language into the Release for which there is no basis in 
the document or in the record before the Court, suggesting in support of its argument that: 
The City reasonably relied on this language to protect it ... Rather than delaying or 
denying pending applications, this language was intended to allow Applications 
like Alpine's to proceed without financial risk to the City. It is safe to assume that 
the City would have never entered into this contract and approved the project if it 
thought that Alpine reserved the right to sue the City despite the City's 
compliance with the terms of the deal. 
Respondent's Brief at 29. 
The City does not support these assertions with any cites to the record. That is because 
the record is devoid of any evidence which would substantiate any of these statements. 
XI. The City's other equitable arguments are without merit. 
At pages 41-43 of its Respondent's Brief, the City offers a veritable laundry list of 
additional equitable arguments as to why Alpine should be denied relief in this case. These 
arguments are premised on flawed factual assertions which are refuted by the record and have 
been addressed elsewhere in this Brief. 
XII. The City is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal. 
The City argues that, if it prevails in this litigation, it should be awarded its attorneys fees 
under I.C. §12-117 and 42 U.S.C.A. §1988. I.C. §12-117 provides for an award of fees only if 
the non-prevailing party's claims or causes of action were pursued without reasonable basis in 
fact or law. The Court of Appeals has held that: "Where questions of law are raised, attorney 
fees should be awarded under I. C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly 
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fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position.,,27 Given the complexity of the legal 
issues presented by this case, and the uniqueness of the underlying facts, Alpine would 
respectfully submit that, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, it cannot be found that 
Alpine's position was pursued without reasonable basis in fact or law or that Alpine's positions 
were not, at a minimum, fairly debatable.28 The District Court concurred. After this appeal was 
filed, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on (1 )Defendant 's Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorneys Fees and (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
Therein, the Court denied the City's Motion for an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117, finding that 
Alpine had not pursued its claims without reasonable basis in law or fact. The District's Court's 
analysis and reasoning would be applicable to the City's request on appeal. 
The City also references 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 as a basis for its request for fees, asserting 
that the standard tmder that statute is "functionally the same as I.C. § 12-117". Respondent's 
Briefat 48. In fact, the standard for awards of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C.A. §1988 to 
prevailing defendants is even more demanding even than the standard under I.C. §12-117, with 
something akin to frivolousness being the required finding. 29 
27 Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64,69, 764 P.2d 431,437 (Ct. App. 1988) 
28 After this appeal was filed, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on (1) Defendant's 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees and (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
Therein, the Court denied the City's Motion for an award offees under I.C. § 12-117, finding that Alpine had not 
pursued its claims without reasonable basis in law or fact. No appeal has been taken from that decision, which is 
attached as Addendum 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in Alpine's Appellant's Brief, the District Court's 
Decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the District Court to determine 
the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled. 
~/I;. 
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Addendum 1 
3.10.12: AMENDMENTS TO FINAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN: 
(A) Subsequent Amendments: 
1. Any subsequent amendment to the final development plan changing location, siting, 
and height of buildings and structures may be authorized by the commission, without 
additional public hearings, if required by engineering or other circumstances not 
foreseen at the time the final plan was approved. 
2. In no case shall the commission authorize changes which may cause any of the 
following: 
(a) A change in the use or character of the development, including ownership. 
(b) An increase in overall coverage of structures or significant changes in types of 
structures. 
(c) An increase of the intensity of use or types of usage. 
(d) An increase in the problems of traffic circulation and public utilities. 
(e) A reduction of off street parking and loading space. 
(f) A reduction in required pavement widths. 
(8) Change Requiring Public Hearing: All other changes in use, rearrangement of lots, 
blocks and building tracts, or in the proVision of common open spaces and changes in 
addition to those listed above which constitute substantial alteration of the original plan 
shall require a public hearing before the commission and approval by the council. 
(C) Expiration: 
1. On the anniversary year after general development plan and program approval, until 
the project is complete, the applicants or applicants' successors, shall file a progress 
report. If substantial construction or development has not taken place within four (4) 
years from the date of approval of the general development plan and program, the 
commission shall review the PUD program at a public hearing to determine whether or 
not its continuation, in whole or in part, is in the public interest, and, if found not to be, 
shall recommend to the council that the PUD approval be revoked. 
2. After action by the commission, the council shall consider the matter and by resolution 
accept or reject it or return it to the commission for further action. Notice and hearing 
shall be provided according to the same procedures as are then applicable to a new 
application, with the present owner of the property being sent notice by certified mail, 
return receipt requested; the city is entitled to rely on the county tax assessor's records 
http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/printnow.php 7/1612012 
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and a title company title search for the name and address of the current owner(s). 
(Ord. 821,2-23-2006, eff. 3-16-2006) 
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Addendum 2 
9.S.0S: DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: 
All provisions of this section, and sections 9.6.07, 9.6.08, 9.6.09 and 9.6.10 of this chapter 
are mandatory, and may not be altered by a development agreement. The obligations 
contained in these four (4) sections shall be enforceable by methods of enforcement of 
ordinances, as well as under the law respecting contracts; the doctrine of election of 
remedies shall have no application. 
In addition to the objectives outlined in chapter 1 of this title, provisions to allow the city and 
developers to enter into development agreements are included in these subdivision 
regulations to achieve the following purposes: 
(A) To assure the city and the applicant that the development will be of greater community 
benefit and that, in turn for providing needed facilities, improvements or services, the 
applicant will be able to plan for and proceed with development. 
(8) To provide a procedure whereby developers of large scale and/or multi-use projects may 
continue with the development of such projects in accordance with the rules, regulations 
and policies of the city as such existed at the time the development agreement was 
adopted, notwithstanding subsequent changes in such rules, regulations, and policies 
which may occur during the time frame of the development agreement subject to and in 
compliance with conditions of approval. 
(C) To enable the city to more accurately plan and budget for necessary public 
improvements in full confidence that development will proceed in a timely and phased 
manner in accordance with the provisions of the development agreement. 
(0) To strengthen the public planning process, encourage private participation in 
comprehensive planning and reduce the economic costs of development. (Ord. 822, 2-23 
-2006, eff. 3-16-2006) 
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For Plaintiff: Steven J. Milfemann of Mil/emann Pittenger McMahan & 
Pemberton, LLP 
For Defendant: Christopher H_ Meyer of Givens Pursley, LLP 
This matter came before the Court on (1) Defendant's Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees and Costs and (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees. By 




23 This case arises from an application Plaintiff made to the City for a pianned unit 
24 development ("PUD") and subdivision in McCall caJled Alpine Village. On February 23, 
25 2006, the City of McCall, hereinafter referred to as "the City" passed Ordinance 819. 
26 






which required developers of residential subdivisions to set aside 20% of their planned 
units for "community housing'\ that is, restricted housing for low-income residents. 
On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff filed their applications with the Planning and Zoning 
Commission seeking to develop a mixed use residential and commercial property (The 







Meanwhile, Mountain Center Board of Realtors, Inc. had filed an action against 
the City of McCall in Valley County Case No. 2006-490~C, seeking the Court there to 
declare, inter alia, Ordinance 819 as facially unconstitutional (the "MCBR litigation"). 
On March 12,2007, Plaintiff presented a revised community housing plan to the 
City Council wherein Plaintiff would elect to provide the off-site units by purchasing a 
12 17-unit apartment complex known as "The Timbers" and converting the units into 
13 community housing condominiums. The McCall City Council approved the revised plan 
14 on March 22, 2007, Plaintiff closed on the purchase of The Timbers on April 16, 2007, 
15 and the parties entered into a Development Agreement with Plaintiff for Alpine ViUage 






On February 19, 2007, Fourth District Judge Thomas Neville ruled in the MCBR 
litigation that Ordinance 819, McCall City Code § 9.7.10., was an unconstitutional tax. 
Subsequent to that decision, the City entered into the First Amendment to Development 
Agreement on July 24, 2008, wherein the City deleted Article VII of the original 
development agreement and lifted the restrictions that Ordinance 819 had imposed 
22 
23 upon Plaintiffs property at Alpine Village. The City further lifted the community housing 
24 restrictions on Plaintiff's property at The Timbers on May 21, 2009. 
25 On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff sent a written demand letter to the City seeking 
26 






payment of damages it had incurred in purchasing The Timbers in order to comply with 
now invalidated Ordinance 819. The City did not respond to Plaintiffs demand, and 
Plaintiff commenced suit against the City in this case on December 10, 2010. 
On December 16, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision on the 
5 parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and determined that I.C. § 50-219 barred 
6 Plaintiffs state inverse condemnation claim. The Court also found that Plaintiffs 
7 
remaining federal claims were barred as unripe by either requirement set forth in 
8 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
9 
U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985). 
10 
11 
following the entry of judgment dismissing Plaintiffs action, Defendant filed its 
12 Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees requesting attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 
13 12-121 and I.C. § 12-117. Therein, Defendant contended that Plaintiff commenced this 
14 litigation "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and that the Plaintiff pursued this 
15 case "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." In return, Plaintiff filed a Motion 
16 to Disallow Attorney Fees, wherein it asserted that the complex nature of Plaintiffs 










reasonable basis in fact or law for bringing this action. 
DISCUSSION 
The Defendant argues that it is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs 
under Idaho Code §§ 12·117 and 12-121. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or 
political subdivision and a person. the state agency or political subdivision 
or the court, as the case may be, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the non prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in 












I.C. § 12-117(1). 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that: 
In any crvif action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal 
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's 
fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, 
partnership, corporation, aSSOCiation, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
I.C. § 12-121. 
Around the time Defendant submitted its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
10 Fees, the Idaho Supreme Court held that where a party requests attorney's fees 
11 pursuant to both I.C. § 12·117 and I.C. § 12~121, the request under I.C. § 12-121 is 
12 denied because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees for 
13 
the entities to which it applies. KeplerqFleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207 I 266 
14 
P.3d 1159, 1165 (2012). roh'g denied (Jan. 30, 2012). 
15 
16 
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff pursued this case ''without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law" and that the Plaintiff pursued this case "frivolously, unreasonably or 
17 
18 without foundation." The Defendant further argues that this is particularly true 
19 considering that the Plaintiff continued to pursue this litigation despite Defendant's 
20 warnings and following this Court's decision in Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, 
21 LtC v. City of McCall, Valley County Case No. CV-2010-276·C and Buckskin 
22 Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC v. Valley County, Valley County 




litigation was not frivolously pursued considering the complex nature of the legal issues 
involved in this case. 




This case presented a number of its own challenging legal issues regarding, inter 
alia, (1) whether I.C. § 50-219'5 adoption of the notice of claim provisions of the ITCA 
3 also carried with it the jurisdictional requirement espoused in case law interpreting I.C. § 
4 6-908; (2) when the cause of action for Plaintiffs federal claims accrued; and (3) 
5 whether the Plaintiff failed to exhaust its remedies as set out in the case of KMST, LLC 
6 v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003). In reaching its ultimate decision in 





parties' characterization of the Plaintiff's constitutional challenge as facial and had to 
engage in an analysis offered by neither party regarding the application of the paired 
holdings in San Ramo Hotel, LP. v. City and County of San FranCiSCO, 545 U.S. 323 
12 (2005) and Williamson County to the facts of this case. 
13 Although the Court ultimately ruled in the Defendant's favor, the Court cannot 
14 say that the Plaintiff pursued this case without a reasonable basis in fact or law as 
15 required in order to award fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-117. Therefore. the Court will 




The Court DENIES the Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
19 
and GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorn 
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